



**Director of
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
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Radicalization Campaign in Nicaragua

//Mounting regional tensions and Nicaraguan fears of the US have offered the Sandinista regime new opportunities to mobilize the population and further restrict the activities of domestic opponents. Costa Rican authorities apparently have disrupted a Salvadoran insurgent support net. In El Salvador, the guerrillas are sticking to harassing tactics as they attempt to sabotage the elections.// [redacted]

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The Sandinistas have intensified efforts to expand the 25,000-man militia and strengthen government-controlled mass organizations. Militia recruitment centers have appeared in towns and villages throughout the country, and 4,000 state employees are said to have joined in the last few days. Additional Army reserve units have been activated and sent to areas near the Honduran border. [redacted]

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Soon after suspending constitutional rights on Monday, the Sandinistas imposed full censorship on the independent media. All radio newscasts and political opinion programs are prohibited, except those transmitted over a government-controlled network that independent radio stations will now have to join. Moreover, all press editions will have to be submitted to security officials for review before public release. [redacted]

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Comment: *//The Sandinistas view recent US Government pronouncements against Nicaragua as a prelude to US-backed moves to overthrow their regime. They fear that the elections in El Salvador could lead to the consolidation of a pro-US government there and encourage neighboring states to form a united front against Nicaragua.//* [redacted]

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Although periodic radicalization campaigns have been a recurring characteristic of the Sandinista regime, this is the first time a state of siege and full media censorship have been imposed. These restrictions probably will remain in force indefinitely because regional tensions are unlikely to abate in the near term. [redacted]

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Weapons Seized in Costa Rica

Costa Rican security forces have seized a large arms cache in San Jose and arrested nine suspected terrorists, including four Salvadorans and two Nicaraguans.

Comment: The detainees probably are part of the Salvadoran leftist support net operating in Costa Rica. The group's attempt in January to kidnap a Salvadoran businessman resulted in the deaths of three terrorists and the capture of two others.

This latest action is certain to heighten Costa Rican fears regarding internal security. It will also strengthen the growing public demand that Costa Rica reexamine its tradition of political tolerance and take more stringent measures against undesirable foreign elements.

Salvadoran Insurgent Attacks

The insurgent attacks on Monday and yesterday inside San Salvador, similar to those against several other cities over the past two weeks,

confirm the guerrillas' short-term objectives--harassment, a show of force, and the probing of government defenses.

Guerrilla attacks on public transport are increasing. Some 70 buses have been destroyed by leftists since early last month, and insurgent propaganda is now threatening drivers with death if they continue to operate during the election period. Since 1979, the guerrillas have destroyed nearly 1,000 buses.

Comment: Hit-and-run attacks against key cities will remain the most important guerrilla tactic in the preelection period. If urban residents continue to refuse to support the insurgents, the guerrillas' accomplishments will remain limited to inflicting physical damage, intimidating some voters, and gaining media attention.

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


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USSR-CHINA: Border River Navigation Talks

The Chinese claim that they reached agreement with the Soviets on "most" issues discussed at the annual session of the Sino-Soviet Border River Navigation Joint Commission that ended yesterday. These sessions are one of the few regular contacts between the two countries and usually produce a navigation protocol for river shipping along the border. They are not related to the more comprehensive border talks Moscow proposed last fall. 

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TURKEY-IRAN: Trade Agreement

Ankara and Tehran have agreed to increase bilateral trade substantially and to consider joint construction of gas and oil pipelines connecting Iran with Turkey and Western Europe. Turkey is to export more than \$600 million in foodstuffs, tractors, and manufactured goods this year, and Iran is to provide Turkey with between 60,000 and 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day at reduced prices. The Iranians say the proposed gas pipeline could be an alternative for Western Europe to the Siberian gas pipeline.

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Comment: Turkish exports to Iran rose from a low of about \$17 million in 1979 to \$238 million last year, and a further substantial increase will strengthen Turkish industries and help reduce Turkey's chronic trade deficit. The trade agreement will help Iran relieve its food shortages, improve its relations with an Islamic neighbor, and reduce its economic isolation. Although the West Europeans are unlikely to be interested in Iran's pipeline proposal, it reflects Tehran's desire to expand economic relations with the West.

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SOUTH AFRICA - ANGOLA - NAMIBIA: Military Activity

South Africa's commando raid last weekend against a base camp of the South-West Africa People's Organization 22 kilometers inside southwestern Angola may have been in retaliation for recent SWAPO military activity in northern Namibia. The raiders claim they encountered a large force, killed 200, and captured a substantial quantity of Soviet weapons. The operation occurred four days after a well-publicized SWAPO attack in northern Namibia in which eight black civilians were killed.

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Comment: //Pretoria's continuing military presence inside south-central Angola and the threat from forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to the east have compelled the guerrillas to operate from the mountainous Cambeno area. Although the South Africans probably will not remain in the area for long, the capture of this base will further reduce SWAPO's limited military activity in Namibia.//

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

USSR: Brezhnev's Speech

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President Brezhnev's speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress yesterday was a hard-hitting attack on US policies. It attempts to regain the political initiative that the USSR had lost as a result both of the US INF initiative last fall and of the Soviet role in the imposition of martial law in Poland. Appeals to Western publics for arms control were accompanied by warnings to their governments, including the US, of the consequences of failure.

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The Soviet leader accused the US of using the Polish question as a pretext for advancing its interests in Europe and charged that US plans were directed against West and East Europeans alike. He maintained that the US wished, by deploying new missiles in Western Europe, to make this region a lightning rod that would take the retaliatory strike in the event of a conflict with the East. Further, he charged that US calls for sanctions were an attempt to weaken the West European countries that are among its major economic rivals.

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INF

Brezhnev announced a moratorium on deployment of SS-20 missiles and other medium-range nuclear weapons in the European USSR, pending an INF agreement--a proposal aimed both at derailing deployment of US LRTNF and countering the US zero option. He also said that the USSR intends to retire older medium-range missiles, probably SS-4s and SS-5s, which the Soviets have been dismantling.

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//In addition, Brezhnev warned that the Soviets would resume INF deployments if "practical preparations" are made to deploy Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in Europe. Moreover, he said that if NATO deploys new missiles that

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are capable of striking Soviet territory, the USSR will take retaliatory measures that will put the US and its allies "in an analogous position."//

//The Soviet leader did not specify those Soviet retaliatory measures but seemed to hint at a Cuban deployment analogy. He may also have intended to suggest such other options as an increase in Soviet intercontinental systems, deployment of new submarine-launched cruise missiles near the US, or the development of depressed trajectory submarine-launched ballistic missiles to threaten the US with short warning-time nuclear weapons. There are technical and military difficulties--principally an overwhelming US antisubmarine warfare superiority--arguing against the latter two options.//

//The warning against "practical preparations" of NATO LRTNF deployment probably is an effort to block West European governments from proceeding with preliminary arrangements for Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile deployment while deferring a final decision until domestic political conditions are more favorable.//

//Although West European governments have expected a moratorium announcement and are aware that Brezhnev's proposal would perpetuate a Soviet advantage, opponents of NATO's INF plan will applaud the Soviet proposal.//

START

Brezhnev called for a hiatus on sea- or ground-launched cruise missile deployment pending the resumption of strategic arms talks. His proposal was a reiteration of the now expired SALT II Protocol, which the Soviets still consider a part of the Treaty. When the Protocol expired last December, Soviet commentators said that US cruise missile deployment would complicate efforts to agree on further reductions of strategic forces.

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The Soviet President's reference to the urgent need to resume strategic arms negotiations reflects growing impatience with current US arms control policies. He stated that without an agreement soon, both sides could develop new types of weapons of mass destruction that could undermine the current opportunities for limitation, reduction, and verification. [REDACTED]

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Other Arms Control Proposals

//Brezhnev also proposed removing missile submarines from their current patrol areas, presumably to keep them close to home shores. For the Soviets, only the declining Y-class fleet would be affected, and these submarines may well be devoted increasingly to targets in Western Europe and Asia.// [REDACTED]

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//Most of the Soviet SSBN force can cover US targets from waters near the USSR. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Conclusion

//The speech will be the basis of a sustained propaganda effort by Soviet officials at all levels to lever Western opinion in a direction favorable to Soviet arms control initiatives. The Soviets will tailor their messages for specific audiences, but they will be particularly interested in providing ammunition for a renewal of the European peace movement this spring.// [REDACTED]

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SOUTH AFRICA: National Party's Politics

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Prime Minister Botha, by shedding the right wing of the National Party, has emerged as a strong and forceful leader of a slightly more liberal Afrikaner party. The rebels, led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht, a longtime personal and ideological foe of Botha, are now the National Party's first Afrikaner parliamentary opposition. Although they pose no immediate threat to the Botha government, they could increase their support among conservatives if the Prime Minister moves beyond modest evolutionary change.

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The split came a week after Treurnicht and 21 other parliamentarians voted against a motion of confidence in Botha over limited "power sharing" with the Colored and Indian communities. The political future of South Africa's 22 million blacks was not at issue.

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Treurnicht, as leader of the powerful Transvaal branch of the National Party, has strong backing from Transvaal conservatives. The Prime Minister, however, won an overwhelming victory at a meeting of Transvaal political leaders by putting his career on the line and by threatening to resign unless given total party support. Following this show of strength, some of the rebels returned, but Treurnicht and 15 followers refused any reconciliation.

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Forcing the Showdown

The Prime Minister, frustrated at being continually blocked by the right wing from introducing initiatives that might reduce racial tensions and enhance South Africa's international acceptability, forced the showdown. In doing so, he evidently went beyond established party policy, which called for separate parliaments for Coloreds, Asians, and whites. The whites, however, would maintain control of the national government through an executive presidency.

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Botha, who is personally committed to bringing Coloreds and Asians into the government, probably realized that Colored and Asian leaders would never accept the

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National Party's previous proposals. He apparently is now determined to make enough concessions to their demands to ensure acceptance. [redacted]

Botha's Prospects

The South African leader has four years before he has to call another election. He probably will try to remove some discriminatory laws, and attempt to give urban blacks at least a semblance of local autonomy. In addition, he is likely to push for constitutional changes to bring Coloreds and Indians into the white political structure. [redacted]

Botha retains a comfortable parliamentary majority and should be able to accomplish his goals. Moreover, he can count on support from the English-speaking opposition parties for some reform legislation, an option he will use with great caution. [redacted]

The Prime Minister, however, cannot work too hard for change without sowing the seeds for further defections and a conservative backlash. Treurnicht's group now has a power base in parliament and could over time unite conservative elements by serving as a rallying point against reform. [redacted]

Up to a third of Afrikaners who went to the polls in the last election voted for an ultraconservative Afrikaner splinter party that won no parliamentary seats, and a large number of conservatives remain as a constraining influence inside the National Party. In addition, events beyond Botha's political control, such as a slackening of the economy or a rash of terrorist incidents, could strengthen Treurnicht's hand. Treurnicht also could exploit the settlement process on Namibia by accusing Botha of selling out the whites. [redacted]

Despite the enormous expenditure of political energy over the issue of power sharing for Coloreds and Asians, South African whites still have not addressed the crux of their problem--accommodating the aspirations of the black majority. As a result, Botha will not be able to satisfy South Africa's critics who are demanding political rights for blacks or to lessen African suspicion of the US policy of constructive engagement with Pretoria. [redacted]

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